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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
of

Respondent's

Brief

CHARLES YONK,
Deceased..

Case No. 7244

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the Sate of Utah, in and far the
County of Cache

Bon. Marriner M. Monison, Judge
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I

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate

of

Respondent's

CHARLES YONK,
Deceased.

Brief
Case No. 7244-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents agree with the statement of facts
as set forth by the appellant, they are not in dispute.
ARGUMENT
The only question involved in this appeal is whether,
where a person dies intestate leaving as his only surviving
heirs nephews and nieces, they inherit under the laws of
this State by representation, that is, per stirpes, or per
capita.

The trial Court held, and properly so, that they inherit by representation or per stirpes.
The right of succession to property of an ancestor is
a mere privilege given by the State or_ Sovereign and is
not a natural or an inherent right, ( 16 Am. Jur. page 77,
section 12, and 26 C. J. S. page 996, section 2), and as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

corollary to this proposition, a person seeking to inherit
must look soley to the statutes in determining what interest he takes. ( 16 Am. Jur. page 783, section 18, 26
C.J.S. 1004, section 6.)
As to the construction of statutes of succession by; the
Courts, the editors of American Jurisprudence and Corpus
Juris Secundum have set forth the rules as follows:
"18. Generally. The general rules of statutory construction govern the constru~tion of statutes of descent and distribution. The fundamental rule is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This intention, however, must be the intention as expressed in the statute itself, and, where
the meaning of the language is plain, it must be given
effect by the courts. The spirit of the statute, it is
said, must be extracted from the works, and not from
conjecture aliunde. The statute cannot be changed
by the court in order to make it conform to its con·ception of right and justice in particular cases ~
( 16 Am. Jur. 783, section 18.)
"~ ~ ~

Rules of law, rather than equitable principles,
are to be applied in the construction of the statute;
and, the court should endeavor to give effect to the
legislature'sintent, irrespective of the intestate's intent;
and where the meaning of the language employed
in the statute is explicit and unmistakable, the court
will not substitute its will for that of the legislature;
or give the words used any interpretation other than
that which they literally import, or ingraft an exception where none exists in the language of the statute.
~ ~ ~ ( 26 C.J.S. page 1006, section 6.)

2
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The la\v of succession in this state is ·controlled by
101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943. This section is complete and comprehensive as to descent and distribution, and was intended to, and does, cover all situations therein arising.
The statute as it now stands is the same as enacted by the
legislature in 1933 and therein known as 101-4-5, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933. The law of succession in 1907 was
known as Section 2828, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907.
This section was later known in the Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1917, as Section 6408.
In setting forth the law of succession our legislature
generally placed heirs into three classes, and provided for
their various interests accordingly. That is, ( 1) lineal
descendants; ( 2) collateral des~endants; and ( 3) next of
kin.
The interest of lineal descendants is controlled by
sub-sections 1, 2, 7, and 8 of 101-4-5, U.C.A., 1943; collateral heirs by sub-sections 3 and 4, 101-4-5, U.C.A., 1943;
next of kin, that is, collateral heirs after "children and
grandchildren of a deceased brother and sister" is controlled by sub-section 6, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943. Where there
are no lineal descendants or collateral heirs, or next of kin,
decedent's property escheat~ to the State for the benefit
of the school fund. (Sub-section 9, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943.)
From 1907 to the present date our statutes regarding
the laws of succession have remained unchanged except
for two amendments. In 1925 the legislature raised the
amount a surviving spouse could inherit from $5,000.00
to $25,000.00 before the excess thereof was distributed
3
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equally between .the surviving spouse and the mother and
father, qr either of them, of the decedent. (Laws of Utah,
1925, page 195.) In 1933 the law of succession was substantially amended by our legislature. Although the subparagraphs were maintained, it dropped the sub-titles, further amending sub-sections 3, 4 and 6.
Sub-section 3 deals with the incident where a decedent dies leaving a spouse but no issue. Prior to 1933 that
portion of the sub-section pertinent to this discussion read
as follows:
"~ ~ ~

If there be no father or mother, then one-half
of such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers
and sisters of the decedent, and to the children of any
deceased brothers or sisters by right of representation."

In 1933 the legislature, after the word "children,"
inserted the words "or grandchildren'' in this sub-paragraph, and sub-section 3 as amended read:
CCI£ there be no father nor mother, then one-half of
such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers and
sisters of the decedent, and to the children or grandchildren of any deceased brother and sister by right
or representaion." (Italics added.)
The purpose of this amendment was to bring the law
in harmony in all its aspects regarding the distribution of
property to collateral heirs, as will be further noted, herein,
thus providing that in each instance, collateral heirs to and

4
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including children and grandchildren of deceased brothers and sisters should inherit per stirpes, or by representation.
The question to be decided here is controlled by subsections 4 and 6 of the present act and they are the same
as sub-sections 4 and 6 of the 1933 act. These sub-sections
prior to 1933 read as follows:
( 4) "When brothers and sisters inherit all: If there
be neither issue, husband, wife, father nor mother,
then in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the
decedent, and -to the children of any deceased brother or sister by right of representation.,

( 6) "Where next of kin inherit: If the decede~t
leave neither issue, husband, wife, father, mother,
brother, nor sister, the estate must go to the next of
kin in equal degree, excepting that when there are
two or more collateral kindred in equal degree but
claiming through different ancestors, then that claiming through the nearest ancestor must be preferredito
those claiming through an ancestor more remote."

Thereafter, in 1933, these sub-sections were amended
to read as follows:
" ( 4) If there is neither issue, husband, wife, father

nor mother, then in equal shares to the brothers and
sisters of the decedent, and to the children, or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by right of
representation."

5
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" ( 6) If the decedent leaves neither issue, husband,
wife, father, mother, brother nor sister, nor children
or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister,
the estate must go to the next of kin in equal degree,
excepting that when there are two or more collateral
kindred in equal degree but claiming through different ancestors, those who claim the nearest ancestor
must be preferred to those claiming through an ancestor more remote." (Italics supplied.)
The underscoring represents that portion of the statute which was added by the legislature in its amendment
of 1933.
The foregoing sub-sections 4 and 6 are the sub-sections that the appellant would have the court believe are
ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain. We believe, however, that a mere perusal of them refutes such an assertion.
In determining the question before the court they must
be read together. Prior to 1933, collateral heirs after
brothers and sisters were treated as next of kin, where
there was no surviving brother or sister, (subsection 6).
However, by the amendments of 1933, our legislature provided that "childr~n or grandchildren of any deceased
brother or sister" of a decedent would not thereafter inherit as next of kin under the provisions of subsection 6they were expressly excluded from its provisions, but they
would inherit as collateral descendents under subsection
4.
Sub-section 4 says:
c'And the children or grandchildren of any deceased
brother or sister by right of representation,"
6
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and the legislature defined the term "inherit by representationn as follows:
"\) ~ \) "by right of representation" takes place when
the descendant of anv deceased heir take the same
share or right in the estate of another person that
their parents would have taken if living 0 0 ~ ." ( 1014-23).

AUTHORITIES
As stated before, whatever interest the heirs in this
case receive is controlled by ;the statutes. 26 C.J.S. page
1030, section 23, says:
"~ ~

There are exceptions to this rule, under the
statutes of a few states, it being held in such states
that nephews and nieces, although they alone are the
heirs or next of kin, take the real and personal property per stirpes~ ~ ~;,;,. (Underscoring added)
0

Also to the same effect is American Jurisprudence.
16 Am. Jur. page 811; section 42:
"~ ~ ~where

all of those who take are more remotely
removed from the ancestor than children but are all
of equal degree of relationship; whether or not they
take per capita or per stirpes depends on the statute
and the construction given it. The general rule is
that they take per capita; this is true, at least, where
th<_>se who take are grandchildren or great-grandchildren. In a few jurisdictions, however, even in
such a case, the heirs take per stirpes and not per
capita. A similiar difference of rule prevails where
7
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the inheritance falls to collateral kindred. In some
jurisdictions, where all the collaterals entitled to claim
are equally near of kin - for instance, second cousins,
twice removed - they take per capita, because they
all take in their own right. In other jurisdictions the
view is taken that they take per stirpes. Where those
who take are of different degrees of relationship, so
that some claim as representatives of others, such
representatives take per stirpes. Where the estate
falls to collaterals beyond the statutory limitation of
the right to take by representation, they take per
capita.~ ~ ~ ." (Italics supplied.)
The trial courts construction of our act to the effect
that the nephews and nieces of the decedent in this casetake by representation or per stirpes and not per capita,
is not only clear from the act itself, but such is supported
by the authorities as well, for in every instance in which
courts have construed statutes substantially the same as
ours, they have without exception so held.
In the case of In Re Swenson et. al vs. Lewis, 160
N. W. 253, the Supreme Court of ~1innesota was concerned with the history of legislation regarding tJieir succession laws similar to dur own. Prior to 1905, the pertinent parts of their act to this discussion read:
"Subsection 5. If the intestate leaves no issue, nor
wife, nor husband, nor father, nor mother, his estate
shall descend in equal shares to his brothers and
sisters and to the lawful issue of any brother or sister
by right of representation.",

8
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and subsection 6 of their act read:
''If the intestate leaves no issue and no husband or
wife, and no father, mother, brother, or sister, his
estate shall descend to his next of kin in equal degree

In 1905, the legislature of Nlinnesota amended its
succession laws, subsection 5 becoming subsection 4 of
the new act. In substance it remained, however, unchanged: It read:
"If there is neither surviving issue, nor spouse, nor
father, nor mother, his estate shall descend in equal
shares to his brothers and sisters and to the Iawful
issue of any brother or sister by right of representation."
Subsection 6 became subsection 5 and read as follows:
"If the intestate leave neither issue, spouse, father~
mother, brother nor sister, nor living issue of any deceased brother or sister, his estate shall descend to
his next of kin in equal degree, excepting that when
there are two or more co~ateral kindred in equal degree but claiming through different ancestors, those
who claim through the nearest ancestor shall be preferred to those claiming through an ancestor more
remote."
The underscoring represents the words in italics as
they appear in the decision. The Court said:
9
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"~ ~ ~subdivision

5 of the former statute became subdivision 4 of the present statute without change in
substance. But subdivision 6 of the former statute,
was changed in- substance by inserting the words,
"nor living issue of any deceased brother or sister,"
so that it now reads as printed above, the inserted
words being in italics.
By the first subdivision of both statutes, if the surviving kin first in the line of descent are issue of the
decedent, they take by right of representation, that
is, per stirpes; and neither statute makes any other
or different provision for a case in which there are
no living c~ildren of the decedent and the first in the
line of desc~nt are his grandchildren. Under both
statutes the per stirpes rule continues so long as issue
of the decedent be living. By the fifth subdivision
of the former statute which is the same in substance
as the fourth division of the present statute, if the
first in the line of descent are brothers and sisters,
they also take by right of representation. The present statute makes no other or different provisiom_
for a case in which there are no living brothers or
sisters and the first in the line of descent are nephews
and nieces or their issue; but by subdivision 6 of the
former statute, if there were no living brothers or
sisters and the first in line of descent were nephews
and nieces or kin of a more remote degree, they took
per capita and not per stirpes. The former statute
made the change from the per stirpes rule to the per
capita rule at the point where there were no living
brothers or sisters and the first in the line of descent

10
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tvere nephews and nieces or kin of a more remote degree. The present statute makes the change from the
per stirpes rule to the per capita rule at the point
where there are no living brothers or sisters, "nor living issue of any deceased brother or sister," and the
first in the line of descent are kin of a more remote
degree than a brother or sister. The present statute
continues the pe·r stirpes rule so long as issue of a
brother or sister be living. It follows that in the
present case the nephews and nieces take per stirpes
and not per capita. o o on (Italics supplied.)
The perogative Court of New Jersey in the Appeal
of Messler, et. al 127 A. 85, also held that where nephews
and nieces were the only surviving h~irs that they inherited by representation. The Court said:

" ( 1) In 1918 the Legislature, by c~apter 63 of the
Laws of that year (P.L. 1918, p. 197), amended subsections 3 and 4 of section 69 chapter 47 of the Acts
of 1914 (P.L. 1914, p. 69) which had amended certain subsections of section 169 of subdivision 14, relating to distribution under the Orphans' Court Act,
(Comp. St. vol. 3, page 3874, et. seq.)
The amendments to subsections 3 and 4, made by the
Act of 1918, make these subsections now read as follows:
'Subsection 3: If there be no husband or widow, as
the case may be, then all of the said estate to be distributed equally to and among the children; and in
case there be no child, nor any legal representative
11
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of any child, then equally among the parents and
brothers and sisters, and the representatives of deceased brothers and sisters; provided, that no representation shall be admitted among collaterals after
deceased brothers' and sisters' children'.
Subsection 4: 'If there be no husband or widow,
child or any legal representative of any child, nor a
parent, brother or sister, nor the representative of a
deceased brother or sister, then all of the estate to be
distributed equally to the next of kindred, in equal
degree, of or unto the intestate and their legal representatives as aforesaid.'
The words in italics are the pertinent parts of the
amendments with which we are now concerned, and
it is clear that the effect of these amendments is to
take the children or representatives of deceased brothers and sisters of the ;ntestate out of their former
classification as next of kin of the decedent and to
place them among the collateral relatives of the intestate among whom the statute now directs the personal estate shall be equally divided, before other
next of kin of more remote degree can participate in
its distribution."
The Court again said:
''The further effect of the amended statute is that it
deprives nieces and nephews, in equal degree, in
their capacity as the representatives of deceased brothers and sisters of the intestate, of the possibility of
distribution being made among them per capita, as

12
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next of kin, for the terms of the statute, in its reference to the representatives of deceased brothers and
sisters, are not mere \vords of description, but are
clearly intended to indicate the capacity in which the
(children) representati,·es of deceased brothers and
sisters of decedent shall take part or share of the
estate."
In the case of Housely v. laster, et. al. 140 S.W. 2d.
146, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in interpreting statutes substantially the same as our own, reached the same
conclusion. The Court said:
"We are of the opinion that the probate judge decided
the question properly. Section 8389 of the Code of
1932 regulates the distribution of the surplus personalty of an intestate. Subsection 5 of that statute provides:
"If no father or mother, to brothers and sisters, or the
children of such brothers and sisters representing
them, equally."
It should be observed that the children of brothers
and sisters, under this statute, take as representatives
of such brothers and sisters, - each representative
or representative group, equally."
The Court again said:
"That our construction is ~orr~ct is indicated by subsection 6 of section 8389 providing "If no brother or
sister, or their children, to every of the next of kin of
13
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the intestate who are in equal degree, equally." So,
after passing the children of brothers and sisters, distribution is to the next of kin, eq~ally, per capita.
Distribution, to the children of brothers and sisters,
however, is not made to such children as next of kin,
but as representatives of their parents. This is made
clear in Lewis V. Claiborne, supra.
Section 8390 of the Code provides: "There is no representation among collaterals, after brothers' and
sisters' children." Up to the point indicated, however, there is representation among collaterals, that is,
up to and including brothers' and sisters' children.
We are referred by counsel to Sizer's Prichard Law of
Wills and Executors, section 767, as expressing views
contrary to those above indicated. Plainly, however,
the learned author was discussing distribution among
lineal distributees, not among collateral distributees."
CALIFORNIA DECISIONS SUSTAIN THE RULE
THAT TI-IE HEIRS HERIN INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION OR PER STIRPES
The crux of appellant's argument is merely this, that
inasmuch as the law of succession does not effect the result
he wishes, that "'this Court shall arbitrarily ignore the express language of the statute, and judiciously legislate
the result he desires. Notwithstanding his declaration
that the provisions of subsection 6, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943,
does not apply, he nevertheless asks the Court to disregard its provisions and hold that the heirs herein take as
next of kin thereunder.
14
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His first proposition is merely this, that subsection
4 of our act does not apply because there is no surviving·
brother or sister. This, because of the result reached by
the California Court in the case of Estate of Nigro, 156·,
P. 1019, and in Re Ross Estate, 202 P. 641. It is true that
such was their holding. However, the appellant failed to
advise the Court that the conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court ·was the result of the interpretation of subsections 3 and 5 of the California act and not
only subsection 3 thereof as the appellant would have the
Court believe. The court said that subsections 3 and5
of its act must be read together. Subsection 3 of the
California act and subsection 4 of our act are substantially
the same, whereas subsection 5 of the California act and
subsection 6 of our act are materially ~ifferent.
The California Court said because children or grandchildren of a deceased brother and sister inherited as next
of kin, where there is no surviving brother or sister under
subsection 5, that subsection 3 did not apply. In contrast
to this, however, our act provides that ccchildren or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister" are expressly
excluded from inheriting as next of kin under subsection
6, and they can only inherit under subsection 4, which
provides for inheritance by representation. Thus, if we
follow the reasoning of the California· decisions these
cases support the respondent's position.
In addition to the foregoing decisions, the appellant
also cites the California case of Johns v. Scobie, 86 P. 2d.
820, 121 A.L.R. 414, as holding that nephews and nieces
inherit per capita. However, such was not its holding,

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

although it c~ntained a fugitive remark to that effect.
This was a case involvi~g the question of the validity of
the delivery of a deed; the Court finding that there was
no legal delivery then considered the question of whether
the gran~ee had acquired title by adverse possession. In
this respect it further found that inasmuch as the grantor
died intestate leaving surviving him only nephews and
nieces, of whom the grantee was one, that the grantee
occupied the property as a tenant in common with the
other nephews and nieces and that there was nothing in
the record to establish the elements of a hostile or an
adverse claim.
The question of what interest the heirs take as between themselves was not involved; it was not probative
to the decision, and the fugitive remarks regarding a per
capita basis of inheritance were purely dicta.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of California has
laid down a rule that under its present law of succession,
nephews and nieces, where the sole heirs, inherit by representation or per stirpes. Such is the holding in the
case of Van Tiger vs. The Superior Court in and for Los
Angeles County, 60 P. 2d. 85'1. The California Court had
before it for consideration sections 225 and 226, California Probate Code, and they read as follows:
''225. No surviving spouse or issue. If decedent
leaves neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to
his parents in equal sha~es, or if either is dead, to
the survivors, or if both are dead, in equal shares to
his brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of the
deceased brothers and sisters by right of representation.
16
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226. If decedent leaves neither issue, spouse, parent, brother, sister, nor descendant of a deceased brother or sister, the estate goes to the next of kin in
equal degree.,
In this case the decedent left surviving him only
nephews and nieces. The administratrix filed her petition praying that the estate be distributed per capita. It
was uncontested. The Court, however, entered its order
distributing the estate per stirpes. The Administratrix
~ought to have the order changed effecting the distribution on a per capita basis, which she claimed was the original order of the court, and that the entry of the order
on a per stirpes basis was an error of the Clerk. At page
853, the Court said:
"It will be observed that the respondent does not
claim that the facts of the case are otherwise than as
set out in the decree nor that the decree does not
distribute the estate exactly as the law directs. The
decree speaks the tn1th as to the facts in the case.
The decree correctly found the facts with regard to
the relationship of the parties to be as above set forth
and no other distribution would have been proper
under the facts of the case and the law applicable
thereto. The rights of the respondent were not impaired by the decree as entered. Indeed it is nowhere claimed in the answer of respondent that her
rights were impaired by the decree. Thus the only
alleged mistake (so-called) is merely that the clerk
correctly entered the decree in compliance with the
law and the admitted facts. There was no mistake.
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It seems to be the respondent's contention
that if she could get the judgment "corrected" so as
to distribute the estate per capita instead of per
stirpes, then the judgment would contain a judicial
error and could not now be corrected. She says: "If,
in its order of January 10, 1934 (the date of the hearing), the Court did err in ordering a per capita instead of a per stirpes, distribution, that error, if error
there was, was a judicial error, and not a mere mistake
of the clerk. Such error, therefore, if error there was,
could not be corrected after the clerk had entered the
decree of distribution" 0 0 #.
0

0

#

FURTHER ANSWER
The case of the Appeal of Hall et. al. 102 A 977,
Maine, a decision cited by appellant, likewise does not
support his position. This decision was based on a statute
substantially the same as existed in the State of California
at the time of the Nigro and In Re Ross Estate decisions
and the the Court reached its decisions along the same
lines of reasoning as did the California Court in the Nigro
and In Re Ross cases.
The mere setting forth of the statutory provisions construed by the Maine Court and again repeating the provisions of subsection 6 of our act, will demonstrate that
this case also supports the respondent's position. Subsection 6 of the Maine statute said:
"If no issue, father, mother, brother or sister, it descends to his next of kin in equal shares 0 0 0 "
Subsection 6 of our Act savs:
.,.
.
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"If the decedent leaves no issue, huband, wife, father,
1nother, brother nor sister, nor children or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal degree \) 0 \)".
Appellant, in further support of his proposition,
quoted from 26 C.J.S., page 1029 (page 27, appellant's
brief.) However, for son1e reason unknown to the respondent, he omitted after the word "permitted," "See Infra
section 23." Section 23 deals fully with representation
and taking per capita, and therein it recognizes that:
"Under the stah1tes of a few states, it being held in
such states that nephews and nieces, although they
alone a:re the heirs or next of kin, take the real and
personal property per stirpes." 26 C.J.S. 1030, Section 23 supra.
Appellant recognizes under the statutes of some
states, that nephews and nieces, where the only survivors,
would inherit on a per capita basis. However as repeatedly pointed out, whether they inherit per capita or per
, stirpes depends upon the particular statute of each state.
The Ohio case of Kinkaid v. Cronin, 22 N.E. 2d. 576,
although cited by appellant in support of his proposition,
does not sustain it because of the particular wording of the
Ohio statute. This case merely held that in interpreting
section 10503-7. General Code, that its provisions applied to collateral as well as lineal descendants.
0

0

0

The estate shall pass to such persons of equal
degree of consanguinity of such intestate in equal
parts, however remote from the intestate such equal
and common degree of consanguinity may be."
"
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The Ohio Court in the case of Snodgrass v. Bedell, 16
N.E. 2d. 646, a decision cited in the foregoing case, said:
"That the language makes its provisions apply to
collateral heirs as well as lineal heirs. It is not limited
to those lineal descendants in a direct line, but includes those of a more remote degree of consanguinity to the intestate. In fact, it says that the
per capita or equal division shall apply "however
remote" the relationship may be from the intestate."
Appellant's concern with the law of escheat can be
disposed of in a few words. In his hypothetical case, the
property would all vest in the surviving heirs - the heirs
of the surviving brothers. There would be no escheat to
the state. This is so elementary that it is unnecessary to
refer to the authorities in support of it.
The appellant has referred to the report of the Code
Commissioners, and although under the·rules as laid down
by the Editors of An1erican Jurisprudence and Corpus
Juris, cited by. him, it is not applicable hereto, as reference is not to be made to such report where the language
of the statute is clear and unambiguous;
"The rule does not prevail where the language used
in the statute is clear and unambiguous." 50 Am. Jur,
page 469, section 454.
The report, nevertheless, supports the fact that the legislature not only changed the law by its amendments of
1933, but it intended to do so.
20
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The Amendments corrected the evils of the statute
as it existed prior thereto, namely, by them it provided
that grandchildren of a deceased brother or sister would.
inherit as collateral heirs without the survival of the
grandparents, and that all collateral heirs would inherit
by representation whether of equal degree or not.
In this connection, the appellant writes a great deal
about justice and injustice. He says that it is injustice to
invoke, as the statute provides, the law of representation
in the case of collateral heirs where of equal degree. In
this respect, our legislature tmquestionably believed that
the right of representation should be applied in the case
of collateral heirs, for it clearly and unambiguously so
provided,. and in this respect, it is not alone, for Cali..
fomia, New Jersey and Tennessee have so provided, and
we do not know how many other legislatures have done
so, for we have attempted to marshall only the statutes
of the states regarding the question of succession, where
there has been a judicial interpretation.
The appellanfs citations of authorities on the question
of statutory construction again sustains the Trial Courfs
construction of our law of succession as amended in the
Revised Code of 133, for they all lay down the rule that
where the revised law in clear and unambiguous terms
made a change in the prior law, such change must be
given effect. The Editors of American Jurisprudence and
Corpus Juris says:
<tin any event, where an intention to change the
meaning of a statute incorporated in a revision or
code is clear, the presumption that no change was
"(1:

<t
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intended must yield to the fact, and the intention to
make the change will be given effect. Moreover, it
is a general rule that in the construction of compilations, :revisions or codes, when a provision is plain
and unambiguous the court cannot refer to the original statute for the purpose of ascertaining its meaning. In such case, a doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of the revised statute may not be raised by reference to the former statutes of which it is a revision."
50 Am. Jur. page 466, section 447.
"Revisions and Codes. ( 1) In General. Courts
should not unsettle the force of every change made
in a plainly worded revision by inquiring into the
authority of the revisers to make such change. So
where the meaning of the language of a revision or
code is plain and unambiguous, it must be construed
without resort to the original statutes which have
been brought into it; but wherever necessary to construe doubtful language in the revision; the original
acts may be consulted to determine the meaning intended, since it is presumed that no substanial change
was intended. In other words, reference may be had
to antecedent legislation only to solve a doubt, not
to create one. ~ ~ ~,59 C.J)'- page 1098, section 468.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of In
Re Swenson:>s Estate, 160 N. W. 253, supra, wherein, as
was previously pointed out, the Court was dealing with
the history of the law of succession similar to that involved in this case, at page 2.55, ·the Court said:

22
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"Appellant invokes the rule that the Revised Laws of
1905 are presumed to have continued the pre-existing·
law unchanged unless an intention to change it clearly appears. This rule is well settled; but it is equally
\veil settled that \vhere the Revised Laws, in clear
and unambiguous tern1s, made a change i!l the prior
la\v, such change must be given effect. State v.
Stroschein, 99 Minn. 248, 109 N. W. 235; State v.
Minneapolis ~lilk Co. 124 Minn. 34, 144 N. W. 417,
51 L. R. A. ( N.S.) 244; Williams v. Reid, 130 Minn.
256, 153 N. W. 324, 593.
In the present case the law as revised is clear and
tmambiguous, and n1anifests a plain intent to change
the prior law. There is no rule of construction which
will permit us to hold that the Legislature intende9.
to continue the former statute by which a surviving
father took the whole estate to the entire exclusion of
a surviving mother. Neither is there any rule which
will permit us to disregard the new clause. which the
Legislature inserted in subdivision 5 of the present
Statute. The insertion of this clause leaves the statute clear and unambiguous, and under such circumstances we cannot reject this clause nor declare it
meaningless, but must give it the effect which the
Legislature plainly intended."
There is no dispute that the legislature provided that
in all instances where the lineal descendants of a decedent
are in equal degree they inherit equally, (Subsections 1,
2, 7, and 8, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943). However, the legislature, just as, expressly declared, that the collateral heirs
23 .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of a decedent to and including "children and grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister," where equal, inherit by representation, (subsections .3 and 4, 101-4-5~
U.C.A. 1943.) Had the legislature intended that collateral
heirs to and including "children and grandchildren of intestate's brother and sister" should inherit equally where
of equal d~gree, it would have so declared, as it did in
the case of lineal descendents. To the contrary, however,
it provided that they should inherit by representation.
The legislature w.as explicit in its language regarding
both lineal and collateral descenden,ts. It treated lineal
descendents as a class and collateral descendents as another class. In one instance, lineal descendents, where
equal, they inherit equally. In the second instance, collateral heirs, where equal, they nevertheless inherit by
representation. This is the law as declared by the legislature.
Respectfully submitted,

·NEWEL G. DAINES
L. DELOS DAINES
Attorneys for Respondents.
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